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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine meeting someone special, falling in love, and deciding to 
start a life together as “one.”  The two of you plan to get married and 
live happily ever after.  However, the state where you both live does not 
legally recognize same-sex marriages.  To bypass your home state’s 
rigid laws, you travel with your partner to a neighboring state where 
your marriage can be legally recognized.  You obtain a marriage 
license, exchange your vows, and move forward with your life as a 
married couple. As expected, your marriage is blissful, but 
unfortunately, your spouse falls ill with a debilitating disease and 
ultimately dies. 
1
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Since your home state still does not recognize same-sex marriages, 
you are precluded from being named as the surviving spouse.  Even at 
death, a state-imposed separation forces you to remain strangers with 
your former spouse, so you decide enough is enough and fight back by 
filing suit.  Your case goes all the way up to the United States Supreme 
Court, where the Court will decide the constitutionality of the same-sex 
marriage ban.  In its analysis, the Court must consider whether a 
relationship like yours, a same-sex marriage, is deeply rooted in our 
nation’s history and tradition, making it a fundamental right requiring 
substantive due process protection.1   
However, relevant case law does not provide any definitions of 
history and tradition, much less any separate analysis of the two terms.  
You begin to worry and wonder whether history and tradition are used 
interchangeably by the Court.  Without a clear definition of these two 
terms, this deeply personal and very important right could have a 
vunerable outcome.  So, what does “history and tradition”2 really mean 
in a substantive due process analysis? 
In a substantive due process analysis, the notion of “history and 
tradition” is used to test whether a right is deemed fundamental, and 
thus protected.3  The Court uses this test to resolve substantive due 
process issues; however, the Court has yet to define the two terms 
explicitly. Often, the words are conflated without explanation.4  This 
 
1. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (the fact pattern 
described above is based on this case where fundamental rights were at stake).  
2. Traditions are often valued memories or customs passed down that one can 
look forward to in the future. See infra Part II. In this respect, tradition provides status 
and identity.  However, the notion of tradition is a choice, based on what is valued 
highly enough to be deemed traditional or a tradition. Ruth Finnegan, Tradition, But 
What Tradition and For Whom?, in 06 ORAL TRADITION 104, 104 (1991). Thus, 
tradition is heavily impacted by choice and value.  Unlike traditions, history cannot 
be impacted by values or choices.  In contrast, history is an objective analysis of what 
has occurred in the past. See infra Part I. History can also look beyond the individual 
law being challenged and consider the underlying components, which establish the 
right at issue. See infra Part III. Together, tradition considers values and choices, while 
history is objectively informed by the past.  
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland., 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).  
4. See, e.g., Zablock v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).  
2
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leaves the Court with broad discretion in discerning what is deeply 
rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.5  However, without a clear 
definition of these two terms, a deeply personal and very important 
right, such as the right to marry, could become obsolete.  
This Comment analyzes the terms “history” and “tradition” and 
proposes a clear, two-part test, that defines and separates these terms 
when conducting a fundamental rights analysis.  While the Court has 
been vague in its analysis when addressing history and tradition,6 the 
terms are not interchangeable, and a two-part test is necessary to 
provide clarity in such a significant analysis of fundamental rights.7  
Part I dissects the definition of “history” in judicial interpretations and 
literary definitions, and addresses whether defining “history” is an 
objective or subjective standard. Part II has a mirrored analysis of Part 
I, in analyzing the term “tradition.”  Part III addresses “the overlapping 
characteristic of both “history” and “tradition,” the judicial 
interpretation of “history and tradition” together, and ultimately 
recommends a two-part test to address the terms separately.  Finally, 
this Comment briefly concludes with an explanation of why a test 
analyzing the two terms separately is necessary in a substantive due 
process analysis. 
I.  DEFINING “HISTORY”  
Broadly, history is a systematic account of humankinds’ origin and 
development throughout time, producing a record of the unique 
movements and moments in life.8  As such, history remains diversely 
valuable and useful.9  Every generation looks to the past to serve as 
 
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. See infra Part III.  
8. E. Sreedharan, A Textbook of Historiography, 500 B.C. to A.D. 2000, ORIENT 
LONGMAN PRIVATE LIMITED 1, 1 (2004), 
https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/247238/8/08_chapter%20i.pdf.  
9. Maurice Matloff, The Nature of History, A GUIDE TO THE STUDY AND USE OF 
MILITARY HISTORY 3, 17 (1979), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5b8f/ceb5a8636f4c1d4959bb2deb82a4d416f981.pd
f.  The notion of history plays a fundamental role in the process of human thought.  In 
this respect, history provides the possibility of better understanding or discovering 
ourselves in the present, by understanding the circumstances and choices that brought 
us to our current lives and situations.  
3
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guidance, knowledge, wisdom, or a source of ideas to meet its own 
problems.10  Although history provides society with a sense of identity, 
human beings create it themselves.11  Without human action, history 
would not exist.12  
The word “history” generally connotes the past.13  The Greek word 
historia originally meant knowing by inquiry or the act of seeking 
knowledge.14  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “history” as “a 
chronological record of significant events (such as those affecting a 
nation or institution) often including an explanation of their causes.”15  
In Ancient Greece, historiography was considered more as moral 
guidance, than factual accuracy,16 and any bad examples were 
conveniently ignored.17   
However, over time, Western Civilization’s thought of history has 
contemporaneously tended to follow a linear progression.18  By the 
Nineteenth Century, the notion of presenting objective historical facts 
became prevalent when interpreting history.19  As such, history is a 
method of understanding the development and evolution of ideas and 
past actions.20  When considering the idea of history, it is easy to think 
about past events.  For example, when students study history in school, 
 
10. Id.  
11. See Daniel Little, Philosophy of History, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 




14. Katy Steinmetz, This Is Where the Word ‘History’ Comes From, TIME (June 
23, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://time.com/4824551/history-word-origins/.  
15. History, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/history (last updated Mar. 25, 2020). 
16. See Philosophy of History, BASICS OF PHIL., 
https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_philosophy_of_history.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2020) (historiography refers to the processes by which historical knowledge 
is obtained and transmitted. “Good examples” to be followed were considered to 




20. See Matloff, supra note 9. 
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they are learning about past events.21  We rely on historians to interpret, 
describe, conceptualize, contextualize, and explain circumstances and 
events of the past.22  The significance of history relies on understanding 
the evolution and development of ideas and understanding why these 
ideas changed or occurred in the past.23  Therefore, history is connected 
to past events because it represents the recollection or objective study 
of events that have occurred in the past.  
A.  Judicial Interpretation of “History” 
The Court has held history teaches and develops traditions.24  
History became an indicator of past events because it was viewed as a 
way of teaching and assisting in the development of tradition.25  In the 
seminal gun rights case—McDonald v. City of Chicago—the Court 
relied on a survey of contemporaneous history within the nation, which 
demonstrated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers included the right 
to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right.26  Because the Court 
framed the right to keep and bear arms (“gun rights”) as the right to 
self-defense,27 the Court considered the history and tradition of the right 
to protect your own home, rather than whether general gun rights held 
a position deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.28  Since 
the Court previously held  “the Second Amendment protects a personal 
right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-
defense within the home,”29 the Court found the right to self-defense 
was deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.  The Court based 
its decision on the Second Amendment representing past acts, 
 
21. See Peter N. Stearns, Why Study History? (1998), AM. HIST. ASS’N, 
https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-
archives/historical-archives/why-study-history-(1998) (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).  
22. Little, supra note 11.  
23. Ronald B. Standler, What Is History and Why Is History Important?, 
http://www.rbs0.com/wh.pdf (last updated Feb. 18, 2013). 
24. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977). 
25. Id. 
26. 561 U.S. 742, 745 (2010). 
27. Id. at 780. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
5
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specifically, “history” in our nation.30  Consequently, the Court 
determined gun rights were deeply rooted in our nation’s history and 
tradition based on the existence of the right included in the Second 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.31  Thus, the past actions 
of the United States informed the Court’s decision to establish the right 
to keep and bear arms was deeply rooted in our nation’s history. 
In United States v. Windsor, the Court decided whether the Defense 
of Marriage Act’s (“DOMA”) definition of a spouse, which denied 
federal recognition of same-sex marriages, was unconstitutional.32 In 
his dissent, Justice Roberts notes it was “beyond dispute that the right 
to same-sex marriage [was] not deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history 
and tradition.”33  This statement follows the prior treatment of same-
sex marriage in the United States.34  Because same-sex marriages were 
not yet fully recognized in every state, Justice Roberts argued the right 
to same-sex marriage was not part of the nation’s history.35  In this 
respect, the notion of history is traditionally interpreted and informed 
by looking at prior conduct and events in the United States.  However, 
the Court ultimately found DOMA’s definition of a spouse to be a 
violation of equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment because it was exclusively defined as a relationship 
between a man and a woman.36  The Court held this distinction singled 
out people in same-sex marriages without a legitimate government 
purpose.37  Thus, DOMA’s definition of a spouse was unconstitutional.  
This decision established a new history for same-sex marriages in the 
United States. 
 
30. The Court successfully avoided engaging in a meaningful analysis of history 
and tradition by focusing on history and ignoring tradition. See id.  
31. Id. at 791. 
32. 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013). 
33. Id. at 808 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
34. Id. (noting that “no State permitted same-sex marriage until the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples violated the State Constitution.”). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at769. 
37. Id. at 775. 
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Throughout American history, states have valued marriage as a 
societal benefit.38  As such, the historical record of marriage 
“contradicts attempts to cast marriage as serving any single, overriding 
purpose.”39  When Congress refused to federally recognize potential 
marriages of same-sex couples, it interfered with a long history of state 
autonomy by denying states the ability to bestow these couples the same 
fundamental status that other couples received when their state 
permitted them to marry.40  As our federal system allows, marriage 
rules significantly differ among states.41  As such, states established 
many marital innovations—including changing aspects of marriage 
“once seen as essential and indispensable.”42  Alterations to the marital 
union, such as the erosion of coverture and the broadening of grounds 
for divorce, may be taken for granted now.43  However, these alterations 
were aggressively resisted and opposed as revolutionary when they 
began.44  What is now viewed as deeply rooted in our nation’s history 
was once a new and debated topic.  Moreover, history changes and 
evolves as the country develops.45  Due to the long history of states 
having authority to establish marital unions, DOMA was deemed as a 
“radical departure from settled federal practice,”46 and therefore not 
deeply rooted in our nation’s history.  
As noted, marriage is not “a static institution so rooted in 
‘tradition’’’—that it can be insulated from constitutional challenge.47  
On the contrary, marriage remains a crucial institution due to its non-
 
38. Brief on the Merits for Amici Curiae Historians - American Historical 
Association - in Support of Respondents and of Affirmance of the Judgement Below 
at 2, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307) WL840030 
[hereinafter Am. Historical Ass’n. Brief for Respondents]. 
39. Brief of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Association as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) WL1022698 [hereinafter Brief of 
Historians of Marriage]. 
40. Am. Historical Ass’n. Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 14. 
41. Id. at 2. 
42. Id. at 40. 
43. Id. at 2.  
44. Id. 
45. Again, presently made choices have impactful weight in the future.  
46. Am. Historical Ass’n. Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 34. 
47. Brief of Historians of Marriage, supra note 39, at 4.  
7
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static characteristics.48  Because previous “traditions and laws 
enforcing gender hierarchy (through coverture) and white supremacy 
(through anti-miscegenation laws) have been overturned,” these 
“traditional” actions are now unconstitutional.49  Similar to other 
successful civil institutions, the tradition of marriage has evolved to 
contemplate and reflect societal developments and the judicial 
recognition of constitutional rights.50  
Additionally, the Court has held  “history teaches [that there] are 
the traditions from which [history] developed as well as the traditions 
from which it broke.”51  Following this, the Court found history can add 
to or eliminate a tradition based on the values associated with the 
tradition.52  History has also taught us “tradition is a living thing” and 
thus open to development.53  When considering history—in the context 
of larger family households—the Court has held that even in “a decline 
in extended family households,” modern society has not eroded “the 
accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and 
honored throughout our history, that supports a larger conception of 
family.”54  The Court considered the past to be a roadmap for our 
nation’s history.55  As such, the past has been interpreted as analogous 
to the term history, and the Court has looked at past conduct to inform 
its classification as history.56  Moreover, past events in the United States 
contribute to what the Court interprets as the nation’s history because 
history requires prior conduct.57 
 
48. Id. at 5. 
49. Id. at 5-6.  Both legislatures and courts have used their authority to lessen 
marriage inequality between spouses and to lift restrictive rules on the eligibility to 
marry. See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
50. Brief of Historians of Marriage, supra note 39, at 16. 
51. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977). 
52. See id. 
53. Id.  
54. Id. at 505.  
55. See id. 
56. See id.  
57. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see also McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
8
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B.  Considerations of the Literary Definition of “History” 
History is interpreted as a “recital of facts given as true,” and “an 
essential part of natural philosophy.”58  History is also defined as the 
“study of the human past as it is described in written documents left 
behind by humans.”59  Thus, history has long served as a guide 
illustrating the past.  Analogous to its judicial interpretation, the term 
history is driven by the theme of past events.60  History cannot be 
defined or developed without conduct or memory from the past.61  In 
its earliest known form in society, history was “simply a narrative 
account of past events.”62  Being developed and maintained by 
humankind, “human nature is itself a historical product and human 
beings act differently in different periods of historical development.”63 
Moreover, history cannot exist without prior acts or conduct.  History 
will always be impacted by current times and choices made; what 
society considers as history in 2050 will be impacted by the choices and 
actions people take in 2020.  As such, what occurs in the history of the 
United States impacts the Court and the interpretation of the American 
Constitution.64 History itself has been seen as a process of qualitative 
change evolving over time.65  What will happen in the future, and what 
 
58. Voltaire, The Philosophical Dictionary, HANOVER COLLEGE DEP’T OF 
HIST., https://history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volhisto.html (last updated Mar. 
2001). 
59. K. Kris Hirst, What Is History?, THOUGHTCO., 
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-history-collection-of-definitions-171282 (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2019).  
60. See supra Part I.   
61. Id. 
62. Bill Nasson, History: The Meaning and Role of History in Human 
Development, EOLSS, https://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E6-22-00-00.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2020). 
63. Little, supra note 11 (describing how Johann Gottfried Herder offered a 
different view about human nature and human ideas with respect to a historical 
analysis).  
64. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (1995) (discussing the impact of 
history). 
65. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 
VA. L. REV. 485, 489 (2002) (addressing the contrast between the scholarly functions 
of legal scholars and historians). 
9
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materializes in the present, is governed closely by what has occurred in 
the past.66  Thus, history progresses as time changes, and our nation 
evolves.  
C.  Is “History” an Objective or Subjective Standard? 
Similar to the Constitution, history is read and interpreted in more 
than one way.67  The Court found it both prideful and unwise to blind 
oneself to history.68  History establishes a hybrid mix of objective 
memory and subjective interpretation.69  An intimate relationship exists 
“between ‘objective’ history and the subjective development of the 
individual consciousness (‘spirit’).”70  Despite this, objectively, history 
can be primarily viewed as something undisturbed by personal bias or 
emotion and more closely related to actual and external phenomena.71  
Further, history is generally the objective recitation of past events.  
However, because these recitations can be personal and perceived 
differently, history can objectively be recited, but subjectively 
experienced or interpreted.72  For example, history has been interpreted 
as the process whereby the spirit uncovers itself and its own concept.73  
Just as scientists disagree, historians may also differ in their 
interpretations.74  However, history focuses on human values, in a 
manner the sciences do not, allowing for a broader scope of 
 
66. Arthur Marwick, The Fundamentals of History, OPEN U., 
https://archives.history.ac.uk/history-in-focus/Whatishistory/marwick1.html (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2020). 
67. Nancy F. Cott, In Same-Sex Marriage Case, a Contest over History, 
BOSTON REV. (July 1, 2015), http://bostonreview.net/us/nancy-cott-supreme-court-
same-sex-marriage-history. 
68. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015). 
69. See generally Little, supra note 11 (discussing how to pursue historical 
objectivity in light of subjective values).  
70. Id. (citing WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (J.N. 
Findlay ed., A. V. Miller trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977). 
71. Sakul Kundra, Objectivity in History, RESEARCH GATE (Feb. 20, 2017),  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31411340.  
72. See supra Part I.  
73. Little, supra note 11. 
74. Marwick, supra note 66. 
10
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evaluation.75  Therefore, despite history being a primarily objective 
analysis, it can also be subjectively interpreted.  
II.  DEFINING “TRADITION”  
The concept of a tradition originally comes from the Latin meaning 
of “something handed over.”76 The word tradition has multiple 
meanings.77  In its barest form, tradition simply means “a traditum; it is 
anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the 
present.”78  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines tradition as “[a]n 
inherited, established, or customary pattern of thought, action, or 
behavior (such as a religious practice or a social custom).”79  Tradition, 
and the notion of that which is handed down, includes beliefs, customs, 
material objects, or images of persons and events.80  At the center of a 
tradition is the value one holds to carry on this custom or belief as being 
established.  Slow changing societies have viewed tradition as the 
equivalence to inheritance.81  The means of making a living, as well as 
the stories and memories of their progenitors, provides one with both 
status and identity.82 
Because tradition tends to look forward, the term refers to the 
process of handing a custom down to later generations over time,83 as 
well as the belief that the custom will continue to be passed down in the 
future.  Traditions are based on values, and they will continue to evolve 
because of the desire to establish something better, more authentic, or 
 
75. Id.  
76. Nelson H. H. Graburn, What is Tradition?, AM. ANTHROPOLOGY ASS’N. 6, 
6 (2008), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-
sexuality/What%20is%20tradition.pdf. 
77. EDWARD A. SHILS, TRADITION 12 (U. Chi. Press, 1981). 
78. Id. 
79. Tradition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/tradition (last updated Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Tradition, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER]. 
80. SHILS, supra note 77, at 13.   
81. Graburn, supra note 76, at 6–7 (discussing how tradition has been viewed 
as a central and important concept of identity). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 6. 
11
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more convenient—resting in those who acquire and create them.84  A 
tradition can be impacted by history.  However, tradition is centered on 
value and looks forward at a future event and considers whether it is 
valued high enough to be passed down; thus, establishing a tradition or 
custom.85  
A.  Judicial Interpretation of “Tradition” 
The Court has held that “history [teaches] us that tradition is a 
living thing.”86  When faced with the decision of the constitutionality 
of a law requiring child support to be paid before getting married, the 
Court held such a law was unconstitutional because it “infringed upon 
a fundamental right, the right to marry.”87  Justice Powell concurred in 
the opinion, pointing to the “constitutional limits” as to state power over 
domestic relations.88  Further, because marriage has been a central 
component, creating the most important relationship in one’s life,89 the 
government needed to show a justification in its actions.90 The Court 
reasoned  these intrusions were contrary to deeply rooted traditions91  
because marriage was seen as a—highly valued—component.92  Thus, 
the Court has interpreted tradition loosely, emphasizing value, to be a 
passed down custom, continuing to be passed down and occurring in 
the future.  
Similarly, the Court recognized a relationship closely tied to the 
right to marital privacy and found Connecticut’s anti-contraceptive 
statute to be unconstitutional.93  The Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the state’s statute when an Executive Director of 
Planned Parenthood and a doctor were fined for violating Connecticut’s 
anti-contraceptive statute; the Court addressed the constitutionality of 
 
84. SHILS, supra note 77, at 13.   
85. See infra Part II Section B.  
86. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977). 
87. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978). 
88. Id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).  
89. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209 (1888)). 
90. See id. at 381. 
91. See id. at 399. 
92. Id. at 397. 
93. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
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the state’s statute.94  Justice Goldberg concurred in the opinion, 
reiterating when fundamental rights are determined, judges are not left 
to decide cases to reflect their personal and private notions.95  Instead, 
they must look to the history and tradition of our nation to determine 
whether a right is fundamental.96  Because marital privacy had a long 
history within the nation and was viewed as a traditional value, 
Connecticut’s statute prohibiting contraceptives was deemed 
unconstitutional.97   
Moreover, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found a statute 
criminalizing homosexual activity to be unconstitutional.98  The Court 
centered its focus on the notion of personal autonomy and the freedom 
one holds to conduct his or her private life.99  Further, the Court held, 
“[h]istory and tradition are the starting point […] of the substantive due 
process inquiry.”100  In its analysis, the Court looked at the tradition of 
one’s personal autonomy and freedom in the privacy of his or her own 
home.101  The Court held policing the private conduct in one’s home 
was unconstitutional because the nation held a tradition (value) of 
personal autonomy.102   
Accordingly, tradition can be both forward- and backward-looking, 
but it is always centered on value.103  With respect to a backward look 
at customs from the past, the tradition of the right to marry carried 
sufficient weight on its own to overrule a statute banning anyone with 
outstanding child support obligations from marriage.104  In a forward-
looking approach, the Court was able to overrule a ban on same-sex 
private conduct.105  Despite the lack of this social custom or lack of 
 
94. See generally id. 
95. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  
96. See id. 
97. Id.  
98. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
99. Id. at 572. 
100. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
101. Id. at 573. 
102. Id. at 578 (holding the petitioners were entitled to respect in their private 
lives).  
103. See supra Part II. 
104. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
105. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
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tradition in the nation, this conduct was not barred.  Because the notion 
of personal liberty in one’s private life helped guide the Court in its 
decision, a new custom of same-sex relationships was established in the 
nation’s tradition.106  The reoccurring events not only create a history 
of events, but it also establishes a tradition and emphasizes the values 
of our nation.  
B.  Considerations of the Literary Definition of “Tradition” 
The study of developing traditions is recently becoming more and 
more popular and acceptable.107  Although the notion of tradition is still 
associated with the concept of something established, and perhaps old, 
it is no longer assumed that this necessarily implies old in the sense of 
years, far less multiple centuries.108  Tradition has been summarized 
into one word: “change.”109 These changes and developments 
associated with tradition can now be recognized as fit objects of 
study.110  Therefore, the general category of tradition is no longer a 
clear-cut definition. Instead, it requires a further clarification of which 
particular aspects or which specified historical or past situation is 
referenced.111  The changes in tradition are driven by the value or 
disvalue placed on the concept at issue.112  People must value a tradition 
for it to continue to exist,113 and the actual use of it—whether in 
personal, artistic, or political contexts—may inevitably be exposed to 
modification, manipulation,  or even elimination.114  Thus, traditions 
are constantly open to change, development, interpretation, and 
occasional manipulation by those who follow or create them.115  
Despite tradition being open for development and change, the critical 
aspect of tradition remains centered on value. 
 
106. Id. at 578.  
107. Finnegan, supra note 2. 
108. Id. at 112. 
109. Id. (quoting Honko and Laaksonen 1983:236 “Tradition is change” as a 
recent summary of the term). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
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 Tradition has sometimes been viewed as the opposite of 
innovation.116  However, it is a commonly used word, and it can be 
elusive.117  The concept of tradition holds a connotation to value,118 and 
the common use of the term has established meaning of something 
handed down, particularly by word of mouth.119  However, tradition 
sometimes holds contrasting definitions.120  The view of what is 
traditional may depend on what has been handed down or viewed as 
valuable enough to be a tradition or traditional.121  Traditions can 
evolve as customs are passed down and selected to be labeled as such.  
Initially, every tradition is based on the choices people make and 
continue to make in the future, centered on their values.  As time passes 
and the nation’s values evolve, so too do laws and traditions.  What was 
once a tradition can cease to be held as traditional, based on choice and 
value.  
C.  Is “Tradition” an Objective or Subjective Standard? 
When discussing tradition, we refer to that which has exemplary 
characteristics.122 Tradition depends on what has been handed down 
and valued high enough to be labeled tradition or traditional.123  The 
Court has held that what is a “deeply rooted tradition” of the country is 
“arguable.”124  As such, what is the tradition of one can contrast the 
tradition of another entirely because not everyone holds the same 
values.  Moreover, tradition includes a choice because it involves value 
and development.125  Ultimately, the key factor in determining what is 
considered a tradition rests on what custom or past event is valued 
 
116. Graburn, supra note 76. 
117. Finnegan, supra note 2. 
118. Id. at 110 (commenting on the notion of value and whose values we are 
considering for tradition). 
119. Id. at 104. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. SHILS, supra note 77. 
123. See Tradition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 79; see also Finnegan, 
supra note 2. 
124. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) 
(critiquing the “traditions” in the Nation). 
125. See supra Part II.  
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enough.126  At a family gathering, choices are made, and traditions are 
established as a result of these choices and actions.  While a tradition 
may be viewed objectively, based on previous conduct and customs, 
those customs are subjectively selected by choice.127  Therefore, 
creating a tradition is decided subjectively by values and informed by 
the interpretation of past events.  
III.  THE CORRECT ANALYSIS: “HISTORY” AND “TRADITION” AS 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT TERMS 
Although history and tradition may overlap, with respect to the 
past, they are distinct terms in all other aspects.  History is the 
development or objective recounting of past events.128  In contrast, 
tradition is centered on values and choice and does not simply recount 
the past .129  While a tradition can be modified and adjusted based on 
one’s subjective values,130 history cannot be modified according to 
one’s personal preference.131  The critical distinction between the two 
terms rests on the ability of tradition to be established or discontinued 
based on the creators’ or adopters’ values and choices.  In contrast, 
history cannot be changed or eliminated once an action has been taken.   
Consequently, because history and tradition are not 
interchangeable, both terms, as a part of the two-part test, must be 
satisfied to be afforded substantive due process protection.  A test that 
analyzes history and tradition separately creates a clear analysis for the 
Court to follow.  This test requires a fact-by-fact analysis, based on the 
totality of the circumstances.132  For example, what society will 
consider history and tradition in 2050 will be impacted by choices and 
actions in 2020,133 and the decisions the Court makes in 2020 will 




128. Sreedharan, supra note 8.  
129. See supra Part II. 
130. Finnegan, supra note 2, at 112. 
131. See supra Part I.  
132. See infra Part III Section C. 
133. See supra Part I Section B.  
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provide uniformity and eliminate the Court’s vague use of the terms in 
a substantive due process analysis.  
The first part of the two-part test looks at history.  The test does not 
look plainly at past events in history.  Rather, it also requires looking 
beyond the individual law being challenged, and considers the 
underlying components and factors establishing its history.134  Because 
history cannot exist without human action, history develops and evolves 
as society continues to grow and carve out history.135  The second part 
of the test considers the concepts and customs. These concepts and 
customs are determined by what is highly valued by our nation to deem 
it a tradition.  Thus, tradition is driven by value and change.136  What 
we value can develop and progress as our concepts and customs 
evolve.137   
A.  The Overlapping Characteristics of “History” and “Tradition” 
In cases discussing fundamental rights in a substantive due process 
analysis, courts analyze whether a right is “deeply rooted in our nation’s 
history and tradition.”138  However, the Court has never provided a 
separate and distinct definition for each term.139  Vaguely, courts 
established both “history” and “tradition” hold different definitions in 
substantive due process cases.140  Because history is developed by 
humankind literally and recounts past events in life,141 it is not only a 
roadmap of past moments; it also creates a sense of identity for 
 
134. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015) 
135. See supra Part I.  
136. See supra Part II. 
137. Id.  Together, history objectively looks at past events and the underlying 
circumstances of the right at issue, while tradition analyzes what past events, customs, 
or concepts are valued important enough by the nation to be deemed a tradition or 
traditional. 
138. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).  
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
141. Sreedharan, supra note 8. 
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society.142  Similarly, tradition can provide a level of identity and status 
by way of passing down objects, beliefs, and concepts of value.143  
Tradition can be influenced by history.144  However, history is not 
established nor shaped by tradition.145  Rather, sometimes, split-second 
actions or decisions create history.  Although the two terms both 
involve decisions and actions of the past, they each hold separate and 
distinct definitions.146  For example, the history of a family tree is 
created by past actions or choices made, while family traditions rest on 
the value we place on certain events or customs to continue occurring 
in the future.  There is value in analyzing both terms separately because 
of the very different meanings each term holds.  Grouping the terms 
together exposes the vulnerability of missing the two terms’ separate 
and essential definitions.   
B.  Judicial Interpretation of “History and Tradition” as a Whole 
The Court has not defined history and tradition separately.147  
However, when analyzed as a whole, the Court has loosely 
distinguished history to represent the past and applied both a forward 
and backward look at customs and social norms to represent 
traditions.148  
This analysis was applied in Obergefell v. Hodges,  where the full 
recognition of same-sex marriage and marital benefits were at issue.149  
While the Court held that the history of marriage has always been a 
union between a male and a female, the Court noted the “[t]he history 
of marriage is one of both continuity and change.”150 Thus, history 
 
142. Standler, supra note 23.  
143. Graburn, supra note 76, at 6-7. 
144. See supra Part II. 
145. See supra Part I.  
146. See supra Part III. 
147. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
148. Id. 
149. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
150. Id. at 2588.  
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continues to teach and develop traditions.151 The Court acknowledged 
different changes, such as the decline in arranged marriages and the 
abandonment of coverture, which helped create a transformation in the 
structure of marriage.152  Moreover, the tradition of male and female 
marriages was evolving.153  As such, the notion of a tradition is a fluid 
concept, established by choice and value. The Court held the 
“[c]hanged understandings of marriage are characteristics of a nation 
where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new 
generations.”154  As our views and values continue to evolve and grow, 
so too do our traditions.  
Although the history of our nation was evolving due to the 
developing traditions surrounding the union of marriage, the Court did 
not view this as a new established right.155  Instead, through careful 
issue framing, the Court leaned on a line of precedents that emphasized 
individual autonomy, personal choice, and sexual equality.156  The 
Court relied on these pressing rights to emphasize deeply rooted history 
marriage held in our nation.157  The Court also relied on numerous cases 
that held “marriage is fundamental to individuals and a building block 
of society[.]”158  Thus, the majority viewed a new class of persons being 
admitted to a long-established right.159  The majority did not see a new 
history being established.160   
Additionally, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court held a state code 
punishing interracial marriage was unconstitutional based on the broad 
fundamental right to marriage.161  Because Virginia was one of sixteen 
states prohibiting interracial marriages,162 a deeply rooted history or 
 




155. Cott, supra note 67. 
156. Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
157. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
158. Cott, supra note 67.  
159. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
160. Id. at 559. 
161. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).  This statute followed the Racial Integrity Act of 
1924, prohibiting a “white person” from marrying any other race.  Id. at 6. 
162. Id.  
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tradition of interracial marriages did not exist.  However, analogous to 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,163 the Court broadly framed this issue as 
the right to marry, rather than the right to an interracial marriage.164  
Consequently, the question of interracial marriage being deeply rooted 
in our nation’s history and tradition was  avoided entirely by the Court’s 
mindful issue framing.165  The right to marry overpowered the question 
of interracial marriages.166  With this tactic, the Court established a 
pertinent, new tradition of interracial marriages.167  Thus, through 
careful issue framing, new rights deemed as historical or traditional 
within our nation can be created by the Court without an explicit 
requirement or two-part test provided.  An official test will enable the 
Court to accurately decide substantive due process issues in a 
systematic process, instead of deciding based on personal preference 
without supporting analysis.  
C.  The Correct Application of History and Tradition 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, it was uncontested that the history of 
marriage has always been a union between a male and a female.168  This 
historical approach required a simple analysis considering past events 
regarding marriage in our nation.169  However, applying the framework 
of the two-part history and tradition test, the Court will look beyond the 
challenged law, and consider the underlying circumstances driving the 
right at issue.170  The nation’s long history of promoting individual 
autonomy, personal choice, and sexual equality supports the underlying 
areas of the right at issue.171  Historically, marriage in our nation has 
 
163. 561 U.S. 742 (2010); see also supra Part II Section A.  
163.  Id. 
164. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.  
165. Id.  
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
169. Id. 
170. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (considering the underlying 
factors of marriage, including the notions of autonomy, personal choice, and sexual 
equality that were driving the right at stake of same-sex marriage prohibitions).  
171. See Cott, supra note 67. 
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also changed over time.172  This aspect of marriage was highlighted 
further when racial restrictions in marriage were deemed 
unconstitutional.173  Beyond the challenged law of same-sex marriage, 
the underlying framework of marriage holds a well-established history 
of evolution and development.174  Thus, same-sex marriage is not only 
supported by the history of marriage, it also ties to personal choice, and 
the notion of individual autonomy.175  This right is also rooted in history 
because of the long past of marriage changing and evolving.176  Thus, 
a deeply rooted history can be established in same-sex marriage based 
on past events supporting freedom of choice in marriage and the 
underlying concept of marriage continually changing and evolving in 
our nation.  
With respect to tradition, the Court noted the history of marriage 
was one of “both continuity and change,”177 highlighting an essential 
element of a tradition analysis: change.  However, the Court did not 
engage in an analysis of tradition,178 likely because a clear definition 
had not yet been established.179 With marriage established as a concept 
of change and continuity, the Court could have done an analysis on 
tradition instead of avoiding it altogether.  Change and value are vital 
to a tradition analysis, and the Court already highlighted how much 
personal autonomy and sexual equality were valued by our nation in the 
choice to marry.180  These concepts were not new; they were passed 
down from a line of precedent.181  Our nation deeply values sexual 
equality and marriage, and these values are areas of continuity and 
change.182  Because these concepts of marriage and sexual equality 
were already deeply valued in our nation, the right to same-sex marriage 
 
172. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (discussing the elimination of arranged 
marriage and coverture). 
173. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
174. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614. 
175. Id.  
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 2595. 
178. Id. at 2602. 
179. The Court avoided a history and tradition analysis by viewing this as an 
Equal Protection issue. Id.  
180. See id. at 2584. 
181. Cott, supra note 67; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
182. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2588. 
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meets the requirements of a tradition, based on our nation’s values and 
choices.  Moreover, these long-held values of sexual equality and 
personal autonomy established same-sex marital rights, which evolved 
into a finally recognized (but not new) tradition.183  Due to this, same-
sex marriage equality could also be deemed a value deeply rooted in 
our nation’s tradition.  The notion of marriage being a building block 
for society and fundamental to individuals further supported the 
position that this newly recognized tradition helped provide a sense of 
identity, which is fundamental to society.184  
Thus, based on our nation’s value of sexual equality and personal 
choice, same-sex marriage was implicitly rooted in our nation’s history.  
Same-sex marriage was also deeply rooted in our nation’s tradition 
based on our nation’s values regarding the continuity and change of 
marriage, personal autonomy, and sexual equality.  Although this case 
was correctly decided, the Court did not engage in any meaningful 
analysis of history and tradition or apply any type of test.185  This lack 
of uniformity or clear definitions of the two terms creates a sense of 
uncertainty for decisions of future cases.  It also opens the Court to a 
significant amount of scrutiny and critique in terms of deciding future 
cases based on potential judicial preference rather than engaging a 
meaningful substantive due process analysis.  
An analysis of history and tradition was almost applied in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago.186  The Court acknowledged the rights 
to bear arms and of self-defense are deeply rooted in our nation’s 
history, which were included in the Second Amendment.187  Instead of 
looking directly at the challenged law, the Court correctly considered 
the underlying components that made up the right at issue.188  Here, the 
underlying aspects of the right to bear arms were the right to protect 
one’s home and the right to self-defense.189  The Court properly found 
that the right to self-defense was deeply rooted in our nation’s history 
 
183. See id. 
184. Cott, supra note 67. 
185. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
186. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
187. Id. at 780. 
188. Id.  
189. Id. at 742. 
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based on the Second Amendment and the history of the underlying 
components making up the right.190  
However, the other half of the test was never addressed.  Instead, 
the Court conflated history and tradition together without establishing 
how the right was deeply rooted in our nation’s tradition.191  Here, the 
right to bear arms was so highly valued that the newly-formed 
government found it to be a fundamental right.192  “[A]nd those who 
were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe 
traditional rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights as a condition for ratification of the 
Constitution.”193  This recognized tradition was established and 
preserved by our nation’s values.   
While the Court correctly decided these cases, it did so without 
applying a full analysis of history and tradition.194  Rather, the Court 
was able to shift its focus entirely to history and ignore the tradition 
component of the analysis.  Or perhaps the Court avoided the analysis 
entirely by centering the right on a different constitutional area of 
issue.195  Without a test separately addressing history and tradition, the 
ramifications could go beyond a mere lack of strength in substantive 
due process analyses.  If the Court does not have such a test to follow, 
this could impact solutions to the Coronavirus pandemic (“COVID-
19”).196  Because potential solutions or attempts to avoid additional 
COVID-19 outbreaks might not be part of our nation’s history and 
tradition at first glance, the Court could easily deny a right on its face.  
However, with this two-part test, the Court would have structure in 
 
190. Id. at 780. 
191. Id. at 742. 
192. Id. at 769. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. at 742; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
195. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (describing the Courts focus on 
Equal Protection as the heart of its argument, rather than engaging in a history and 
tradition analysis). 
196. The Coronavirus is a respiratory illness, referred to as “COVID-19,” and 
created a worldwide pandemic in 2019. Lauren M. Sauer, M.S., What Is 
Coronavirus?, JOHN HOPKINS MED. (June 27, 2020), 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus. 
(explaining that the Coronavirus is a respiratory illness, referred to as “COVID-19,” 
that created a worldwide pandemic in 2019).  
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deciding these current and pressing issues with clarity.  While a 
fundamental right might not be part of our nation’s history and tradition 
on the exterior, a closer look following the proposed test’s guidelines 
could in fact uncover underlying roots of history or values establishing 
a tradition in our nation.  The fundamental rights of Americans could 
be at risk without clear definitions and uses of the terms in a substantive 
due process analysis.  This two-part test will not only strengthen the 
Court’s analysis and provide clarity in substantive due process issues, 
but it will also ensure protection of Americans’ fundamental rights.   
CONCLUSION 
Substantive due process protects fundamental rights, and history 
and tradition are separate, distinct terms that play imperative roles in 
that analysis.  There is value in keeping the terms removed from one 
another because of the different definitions each term brings to the 
analysis.  A test requiring the separate evaluation of history and 
tradition will positively impact substantive due process decisions by 
creating uniformity and eliminating the vague use of the two terms.  
Additionally, the test will force the Court to analyze the terms 
separately.  The current lack of clear guidance has left the Court with 
broad discretion to decide which rights are deeply rooted in our history 
and traditions and which are not, without supporting analysis.  The 
outcome of the same-sex marriage ban weighing down on a grieving 
spouse could have been severely impacted if the Court vaguely lumped 
the two terms together without finding another constitutional issue in 
the case.  Future cases might not be as fortunate without a history and 
tradition test applied.   
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By implementing a two-part test that analyzes history and tradition 
separately, substantive due process cases will not be able to be decided 
by conveniently avoiding one term over the other, based on judicial 
preference.  The benefit of a two-part test goes beyond clear guidance 
for the Court when interpreting constitutional law.  The test ensures 
protection for fundamental rights that could otherwise been overlooked 
or misconstrued to not be deeply rooted in our nation’s history and 
tradition.  For this reason, a test separately focusing on history and 
tradition will ensure a balanced analysis to determine whether a right 
will be afforded substantive due process protection. 
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